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Rebecca E. Zietlow
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I. INTRODUCTION

When I was a legal services lawyer on the South Side of
Chicago, my colleagues engaged in an ongoing debate over
whether race discrimination cases fit within our mandate to practice "poverty law." On the one hand, race discrimination was a
barrier to the ability of some of our clients to find good jobs and
work their way out of poverty. On the other hand, race discrimination cases did not directly redress the poverty of our clients.
Clients "lucky" enough to have a job where they experienced
discrimination arguably needed our help less than those who depended on public benefits. Our thinking reflected the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause which disaggregates
the relationship between race and class. The Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence did little to help my African
American clients on the South Side of Chicago. Even though the
primary problem of our clients was poverty, race discrimination
provided the only framework of anti-discrimination law to meet
their needs. The Supreme Court long ago found that economic
classifications do not trigger "heightened scrutiny" for equal protection analysis'- only race- based classifications get heightened
1. Associate Professor of Law. University of Virginia.
2. Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values. University of Toledo College
of Law. Thanks to Michele Adams and W. David Koeninger for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts. Thanks to Brianna White for her excellent research assistance. and to
the University of Toledo College of Law for funding my research.
3. See Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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scrutiny. Moreover. many statutes protect against race discrimination, but virtually none protect against discrimination on the
basis of poverty! Yet it was rarely possible for us to show that
our client's _legal troubles were caused by intentional race discrimination.' Our poor, Black clients needed a new formulation
of their rights. which would take into account the confluence of
race and class that limited their ability to improve their lives, and
create positive measures to remedy it.
Despite the advances that African Americans have made in
our country as a result of the Civil Rights movement of the
1960s, poverty stubbornly persists in communities of color
throughout our country. More than 50 years after Brown v.
Board of Education" and 40 years after the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,' people of color are still lagging behind whites in virtually
every indicator of economic success. H Yet our race discrimination
law is simply unable to address that frustrating phenomenon. In
Brown. the Court established a paradigm by holding that racial
segregation violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of Brown and its progeny, a person has the right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment based on prejudice against that person's immutable
characteristics. However, the Brown paradigm fails to account
for the inter-relationship of race and class in the subordination
of people of color in our society. At the dawn of the twenty-first
century, we need a new way of thinking about civil rights. We

-1. For example. the regulations governing federal Section 8 housing subsidy
vouchers prohibit discrimination on the basis of ··race. color. religion. sex. national origin. familial status or disabilitv .. but not level of income. 2-1 C.F.R. 982.304 (2008). In;tead. the regulations put the. burden on the tenant to locate a "'willing .. landlord. 2-1
C.F.R. 982.302 (2008). When I practiced law in Chicago. my clients with Section 8 certificates often had difficulty locating a landlord willing to rent to them and accept their certificate.
5. It is arguable that societal race discrimination. and even indirect intentional discrimination by the government. caused our clients' predicament. See NICHOLAS
LP,IA~N. THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT
CHANGED A\IERICA 89-95 (1991). However. the Court has repeatedly held that general
allegations of societal discrimination. without more. do not establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g.. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In addition.
the Court has held that remedying general societal race discrimination does not justify
affirmative action programs that classify on the basis of race. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke. -138 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ .. 347 U.S. 483 (195-1).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-352. July 2. 196-1. 78 Stat. 241. codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (199-1).
8. For example. in 2004. Black households had a median income of $30.134. while
overall median income was $4-1.389. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/
archives/income_ wealth/005647 .html.
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need to move beyond the paradigm of equal treatment and towards a paradigm of more substantive equality rooted in the
principle of anti-subordination.
Instead of formal equality, a good starting point for re9
thinking civil rights is the concept of "belonging." Rights of belonging are those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who
belongs to the national community of the United States and that
10
facilitate equal membership in that community. Rights of belonging include economic rights because in order to fully belong
in our society, people need more than simply the freedom from
intentionally discriminatory treatment. They also need economic
empowerment. 11 Risa Goluboff's recent book, The Lost Promise
of Civil Rights, gives us a glimpse of what civil rights law would
look like without the disaggregation of race and class, and provides a great background for understanding rights of belonging.
In the book, Goluboff describes another tradition of civil rights
from our history, based not in the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment but instead in the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of economic empowerment. Goluboff's lessons
from the past can help us to re-envision civil rights law for the
future by providing a basis for a fuller understanding of rights of
belonging.
In The Lost Promise, Goluboff provides three valuable contributions for anyone who teaches, studies, or has any interest in
constitutional law and anti-discrimination law. First, she helps us
to understand how the meaning of civil rights developed into
what we understand today as civil rights, and details an alternative approach that was abandoned by the attorneys who litigated
early civil rights cases. Thus, her second contribution is that she
reminds us that the current paradigm is not the only way to think
about equality law. Finally, and most importantly, she provides
an eye-opening framework for re-thinking equality law to address more effectively the problems in our society today. In that
framework, economic rights are paramount because the subordination of people of color in our society has never been just

9. See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW. ENFORCING EQUALITY CONGRESS. THE
CONSTITUTION. AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6--7 (2006).
10. The concept of '"belonging'" has its roots in the Reconstruction Era theorv of
citizenship rights and is inspired by the work of Professor Kenneth Karst. See ~.g..
KENNETH KARST. BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQL'AL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITt.:TIOl'i ( 1989). ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 6--7.
II. Civil rights leader Martin Luther King recognized the importance of economic
rights to in our society. and spent the last years of his life campaigning for those rights.
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about race. Rather, racism has been used as a means to further
the economic exploitation of workers.
The Lost Promise has already received recognition as a
ground-breaking work of legal history. 12 Goluboff's innovative
work goes beyond other historical works on the civil rights
movement because she not only explores the connection between the labor movement of the early twentieth century and
the civil rights movement of the later twentieth century, but also
examines the doctrinal connections between the two move13
ments. Her detailed description of the development of constitutional doctrine warrants the same recognition by constitutional
scholars and theorists. For too long, constitutional theorists have
also disaggregated the relationship of race and class when theorizing constitutional principles of equality. Informed by
Goluboff's work, the theory of rights of belonging synthesizes
racial equality and economic rights in order to effectively combat the subordination of all workers in our society.
II.

THE BROWN PARADIGM AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

The equal protection clause is triggered when laws divide
people into categories and treat categories of people differently.
As any student of constitutional law knows, the Court first identified racial classifications as those that might warrant heightened scrutiny in Justice Stone's footnote four of U.S. v. Carolene
Products ~ and reaffirmed that commitment in the case of Korematsu v. U.S. 1; In Brown, the Court overturned the 1896 case of
Plessy v. Ferguson 16 and held that contrary to its ruling in Plessy,
"separate'' could never be "equal." 17 Since Brown, the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to race-based classifications, striking down
1

12. For example. the book recently received the 2008 Willard Hurst award given by
the Law and Society Association for the best legal history book written in 2007.
13. Bv comparison. in her book. TO STAND AND TO FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003). historian Martha Biondi explains
how the northern civil rights movement grew out of the labor movement. but she does
not discuss the legal theories employed by lawyers who worked with the movement. In
his book. FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRuGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). legal historian Michael Klarman examines
the development of race discrimination law throughout the first half of twentieth century,
but he does not discuss the labor movement.
14. U.S. v. Carolene Products. 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938).
15. Korematsu v. U.S .. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16. Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Brown. 347 U.S. at 495.

2008]

BOOK REVIEWS

357

virtually every such classification, including laws requiring segregation in all government facilities 1x and those outlawing interracial marriage. 1y Thanks to the Brown paradigm, African
Americans enjoy a constitutional right against government discrimination on the basis of race. By ending our racial caste system, Brown and its political companion, the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, affirmed a fundamental human right.
The Brown paradigm has its weaknesses, however. The
Court has severely limited the scope of the equal protection
20
clause by holding that it does not apply to private actors and
requiring a showing of discriminatory intent to trigger heightened scrutiny. 21 These holdings have greatly limited the potential
of the equal protection clause to combat race discrimination.
Moreover, as Equal Protection law has developed, it has developed doctrinal weaknesses. The concept of equal protection requires the comparison of identical groups of people. To oversimplify, only "likes" need be treated "alike." Determining
whether groups of people are alike or different can cause uncertainty.
This uncertainty is most apparent in the Court's treatment
of the two principle "suspect classifications" that it has identified, those based on race and those on gender. When the law
categorizes on the basis of race, treating the white majority differently from racial minorities, courts must consider whether
whites and members of minority groups are alike. On the one
hand, people are people, and the law correctly assumes that
there are few if any inherent differences based on the color of
one's skin. 22 Race is a social construct, not a biological difference.23 However, centuries of racial discrimination and racial
subordination have left their mark on our society, and on people
of color in our society. Although there are few if any biological
differences between Blacks and whites, it is hard to say that
Blacks and whites are really equal in terms of the opportunities

18. See. e.g, Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson. 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (addressing
beaches): Gayle v. Browder. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (addressing buses): Holmes v. Atlanta.
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (addressing golf courses): New Orleans City Park Improvement
Ass'n v. Detiege. 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (addressing parks): See also KENNETH L. KARST.
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL C!TIZE'\SHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 80 ( 1989).
19. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. The Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
21. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. See William M. Richman. Genetic Residues of Ancient Migrations: An End to
Biological Essentialism and the Reification of Race. 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 387 (2006).
23. See IAN HANEY-L6PEZ. WHITE BY LAW (1996).
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that they face, even in the twenty-first century. Given that there
is significant evidence that whites and Blacks are not equal in
terms of opportunities and resources, are they really alike? Or, is
a person's race sufficiently predictive of one's economic and social success that people of color and whites really are not alike,
and differential treatment is justified, at least when that treatment is geared towards improving the opportunities and resources of people of color?
Currently, the Court has adopted the stance that whites and
racial minorities are sufficiently alike that virtually any differential treatment violates the principles of equality. As Justice
Scalia announced in his concurrence to Adarand, "In the eyes of
our government, we are just one race here. It is American ... " 24
Because this view fails to account for the historic subordination
of people of color in our society. the race blind approach to race
based categories hampers the ability of racial minorities to obtain equality. The United States Supreme Court has applied this
approach to strike down affirmative action measures intended to
benefit racial minorities. 2" Thus, the current Supreme Court's
approach significantly hampers the attempts of people of color
to use the political process to obtain substantive equality.
Treating "likes" alike and different people differently is also
problematic in the area of gender discrimination law. While men
and women are equal in abilities in many contexts, there are biological differences between men and women that simply do not
fit into the ·'equal treatment" paradigm. The Supreme Court has
been inconsistent when determining which differences are "real"
and which are outdated stereotypes. For example, the Court has
found that pregnancy is not a gender related condition justifying
26
differential treatment, but the capacity to get pregnant is such a
condition. 27 Not surprisingly, the equal treatment paradigm has
brought about limited economic progress for women. The "gender gap'' between wages earned by men and women for comparable work persists, and is virtually identical to that in the early
1970s, when the Court first recognized gender as a protected
class."~ Thus, gender discrimination law is also an ineffective solution for the inequality experienced by women of color.
24. Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200.239 (1995).
25. See. e.g.. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Gratz v.
Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
26. Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
27. Michael M. v. Superor Ct. of Sonoma Cty .. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
28. http://usgovinfo.about.cornlod/censusandstatistics/a/paygapgrows.htm. Moreover.
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One solution that scholars have offered to the samenessdifference dilemma is to replace the equal treatment model with
an "anti-subordination" model.'~ Under the anti-subordination
approach, courts would evaluate categories differentiating people, not based on whether or not they treat people equally. but
on whether the cat_egory empowers or su?ordinates a group, of
people that have htstoncally been subordmated by the law. In
the context of race, courts would strike down laws that subordinate people of color and uphold laws that empower them. In the
context of gender, courts would strike down laws that subordinate women and uphold laws that empower them. 11 Like the
equal treatment model. the anti-subordination model has roots
in the Brown decision.'' In Brown. the Court emphasized the
subordinating impact of racial segregation on African American
children.'' "Separate but equal" could never be truly equal in
public education because race-based categories had been used to

there is ample evidence that the equal treatment model has hurt women economically. A
number of scholars have noted that at least in the context of family law. gender neutrality
has a harmful impact on women. See. e.g .. MARTHA ALBERTSO:-.: FINEMA~. THE
ILLuSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 180-85
(1991 ): David L. Chambers. Rethinking the Substalllive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce. 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (19S5). Lower courts have held that sex-custody presumptions are unconstitutional. and they have widely been replaced by the gender neutral
"best interests of the child" test. See Katherine T. Bartlett. Preference, Presumption. Pre-

disposition, and Common Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American
Law lnstitllle's Family Dissollllion Project. 36 FAM. L. Q. II. 11-17 (2002). As a result.
women often bargain for custody. accepting lesser economic compensation in exchange
for their husbands' agreement not to contest custody. FI~EMA:-.:. supra at 180-S5. Even
though a significantly higher percentage of married women with children work outside
the home than did so forty years ago. women continue to suffer economically after divorce. Divorced mothers overwhelmingly experience a decrease in income while their exhusbands tend to experience an increase in income. after their divorce. See Suzanne M.
Bianchi et al.. The Gender Gap in the Economic Well-Being of Non-resident Fathers and
Custodial Mothers. 36 DEMOGRAPHY 195. 197 (Mav 1999).
29. See CATHARINE MACKI~:-.10:-.:. TOWARD.A FEMI~IST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989): Ruth Calker. Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection. 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (19S6): Victor C. Romero. Are Filipinas Asian or Latinas? Reclaiming the Anti-Subordination Objective of Equal Protection After Grutter and Gratz. 7 U.
PA. J. CONST L. 765 (2005).
30. Calker. supra note 29. at 1008.
31. Justice Ginsburg hinted at such an approach to gender based classifications in
U.S. v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515. 555 (1996). See Denise C. Morgan. Anti-Subordination
Analysis Ajier United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single
Sex Public Schools. 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 3Sl.
32. See Reva B. Siegel. Equalit1· Talk: Antisubordination and Amic/assification Values in Constillltional Struggles 01-er Brown. 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) ..
33. Brown v. Board of Educ .. 347 U.S. 483. 494 (1954) (Stating. "To separate (Black
children) from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the communitv that mav affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
·
·
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34

subordinate African Americans. This reasoning suggests that
racial segregation was unconstitutional, not because it treated
Blacks and whites differently, but because its purpose was to
subordinate African Americans.
The anti-subordination model is appealing because it goes
beyond a formalist approach to equality and attempts to get at
the root cause of inequality by focusing on the effect of legal
categories. The problem with the anti-subordination approach is
that it has a somewhat awkward fit with the equal protection
clause and with the American ideal of equality. To many, the
anti-subordination approach is not equal because it requires
"special" treatment. In its affirmative action jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has rejected this model in race discrimination
law precisely because of this asymmetry.
The Court's rejection of the anti-subordination model reflects another weakness of that model-its subjectivity. Antisubordination fits awkwardly into equal protection law, which
values neutral principles like facial equality. The antisubordination model requires judges to make value judgments
about whether a category is subordinating or not. Reasonable
people can and often do differ about whether a race or gender
based category is subordinating. For example, while proponents
of affirmative action measures to remedy race discrimination argue that such measures are needed to undo race-based subordination, opp<;me~ts of affirmative action ~rg~e t~at_ a~y rac_e
based classtftcatiOns further a system of ractal mfenonty. Feminists often differ over whether gender based classifications are
justified as anti-subordination measures, or whether they simply
perpetuate outdated stereotypes about women's interests and
capabilities. For example, prominent feminists have taken opposing positions over the constitutionality of public single sex
education and the questions of whether employers may provide
health benefits for maternity leave when they do not provide
36
benefits for the comparable health concerns of men. These de-

34. !d. at 495.
35. Justice Clarence Thomas is one of the best known. and most influential, people
to make such an argument; see. e.g .. Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 206. 350 (2003)
(Thomas. J .. dissenting).
36. See Wendy W. Williams. The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism. 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175. 191. 195-96 (1982). The debate itself exposes the problem of equal protection and gender. Is there really any condition
experienced by men that is comparable to pregnancy? There is a strong argument that no
such condition exists.
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bates, often heated, expose more problems inherent in applying
the Brown paradigm.
However, perhaps the worst flaw of the Brown paradigm is
that its failure to address the intersection of race and class belies
the continued correlation between race and class in our society.
The neighborhood in which I practiced law, once known as
"Bronzeville," 17 aptly illustrates the historical intersection between race and class. During the middle of the twentieth century
the area was a thriving community full of jazz clubs, theaters and
other cultural centers, home of celebrities like Joe Louis and
Mahalia Jackson. 3H Wealthy Blacks lived in the crowded
neighborhood of Bronzeville because segregation prevented
them from moving to more upscale neighborhoods.w After the
success of the civil rights movement, those folks could and did
move to the suburbs and other tonier locations. While I was
practicing law there in the early 1990s, the former Bronzeville
was still virtually 100% African American, but it had become
4
one of the poorest neighborhoods in the country. " Residents of
Bronzeville were unable to leave the neighborhood, not because
of race discrimination per se, but because they could not afford
to move. 4 '
Now I live in Toledo, Ohio, the location of the Auto-Lite
strike of 1934, a momentous event in labor history which served
as a catalyst for congressional passage of the National Labor Relations Act, establishing a statutory right to join a union and en42
gage in collective bargaining. In Toledo today, numerous workers of all races have lost their well-paying, union-protected
factory jobs with health benefits and must instead work in low
paying service sector jobs without any job security or health in-

37. Recently. gentrification has reached the northern edge of Bronzeville and real
estate developers have revived the term. See David Roeder. Bronzeville 'land grab';
Residents say they just want area to 'maintain its mixed-income character.· CHICAGO SUNTIMES. May 8. 2008. at 43.
38. See ALAN EHRENHALT. THE LOST CiTY: DISCOVERING THE FORGOITEN
VIRTUES OF COMMUNITY IN THE CHICAGO OF THE 1950S at 153-54(1995): LEMANN.
supra note 5. at 64.
39. LEMANN. supra note 5. at 64.
40. EHRENHALT. supra note 38. at 261-62.
41. In recent years. the South Loop development has spread to the northern edge
of "Bronzeville" and development has revived the economy of the neighborhood. However. my former clients now face another dilemma-being driven out of the neighborhood by higher real estate prices. See Roeder. Sllpra note 37.
42. See Rebecca E. Zietlow & James Gray Pope. The Auto-Lite Strike and the Fight
Against "Wage Slavery." 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 839 (2007).
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surance. The Brown paradigm does nothing to help those workers either, including those who are people of color.
There have been attempts by lawyers and political actors to
combat both racial and economic subordination since the 1930s.
The most important such attempt was Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. which outlawed race and gender discrimina43
tion in employment. Labor leaders and civil rights leaders
joined together to fight for that protection, and their alliance was
crucial to the measure's success. 44 Title VII was intended not
only to end race and gender discrimination, but also to empower
people of color economically by removing race and gender based
barriers to their economic success.
The Warren Court also occasionally recognized the link between race and poverty. For example, in Harper v. Virginia, the
Court outlawed the use of poll taxes in state elections, in an
opinion that implicitly recognized the fact that those taxes had
historically been used, not only to discriminate on the basis of
wealth. but also (and more often) to deny the franchise to Afri4
can American voters. ' Similarly, in King v. Smith. the Court
struck down an Alabama law which prohibited welfare recipients
from "co-habiting" with a male companion because it was inconsistent with federal regulations governing Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. 4" The Court held that local welfare admin47
istrators were required to follow federal regulations. Limiting
the discretion of local caseworkers was not just a matter of economic justice, but also of racial justice. Not coincidentally, the
case originated in Alabama, where white welfare administrators
had been using the "spouse in the house" visits to harass African
American women receiving welfare benefits. 4K The Court's King
opinion implicitly recognized the fact that many people in southern states deeply resented the fact that African American
women were eligible for welfare. The availability of welfare had
an inflationary impact on the wages of low skill workers because
it provided an alternative to agricultural and domestic work.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-352. July 2. 1964.78 Stat. 241. codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000etseq. (1994).
44. See ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 118.
45. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The 24th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from leveling poll taxes in federal
elections. U.S. CONST. Amend. XXIV.
46. King v. Smith. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
47. /d.
48. See MARTHA F. DAVIS. BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVE\IENT ( 1993).
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Thus, the availability of welfare undermined the system of economic subordination that Goluboff describes so eloquently in
her book.
Since then, however, racial and economic subordination
have been disaggregated in our anti-discrimination law. For example, poverty lawyers attempted to follow the Brown model
and convince the Court that poverty was a suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny. They were unsuccessful, and in Dandridge v. Williams the Court stated emphatically that all economic classifications are subject to deferential rational basis
review, even if they harm poor people.•" The Dandridge Court
did not even consider the correlation between race and poverty
in our society. The Dandridge opinion enables discrimination on
the basis of wealth to serve as a proxy for race discrimination.
For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Court found that the decision
of the virtually all-white Village of Arlington Heights to require
single family housing and reject a zoning variance for builders of
low income housing was permissible because it was constitutionally permissible for the Village to maintain its single family mid50
dle class identity. The Court found that the history of racial segregation in Arlington Heights was irrelevant because there was
no evidence that the decision being challenged was based on
1
race discrimination.'
Ironically. the low level of scrutiny for economic based classifications makes possible one of the few legal measures available for the empowerment of African Americans. While the
Court has repeatedly struck down race based affirmative action
measures, it has also repeatedly noted that affirmative action
measures for economically disadvantaged students are constitu52
tionally permissible. Because students of color are statistically
so much more likely than white students to be economically disadvantaged, such programs should disproportionately benefit
those students. Thus, economic affirmative action has become a
safe way for universities to attempt to diversify their student
bodies. The Supreme Court has also spoken approvingly of diversity measures such as the Florida 10% program, which guar-

49.
50.
(1977).
51.

52.

Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471 ( 1970).
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Develop. Corp .. 429 U.S. 252
!d.
See. e.g.. Gratz v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244. 297 (2003 ).
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antees the top 10% of every graduating high school class a spot
in a state university."
Court approval of these remedies is ironic. The irony of the
first measure is that its very success at achieving racial diversity
depends on the failure of African Americans to achieve economic success. The irony of the second measure is that its success depends on the continued racial segregation of Florida high
schools. A country whose economic success has depended on
centuries of unpaid and underpaid work of African American
workers should be able to better provide for the sons and daughters of those workers.
III. THE LOST PROMISE
In The Lost Promise, Risa Goluboff shows that the disaggregation of race and class was not inevitable in our civil rights
law. From the founding of the NAACP in 1909 and the Civil
Rights Section of the Department of Justice ("CRS") in 1939
through the Supreme Court's decision in Brown,'4 Goluboff details the development of civil rights law during the early years of
civil rights practice, and describes another way of thinking about
civil rights, lost until now, that integrates race and class in a dynamic fashion. Goluboff reminds us that throughout our nation's
history, African Americans have suffered not only from racial
subordination, but also economic subordination. While slavery is
the most obvious example of exploitation of labor facilitated by
racial subordination, Goluboff describes in great detail the extent to which such exploitation continued under the Jim Crow
system that dominated the south for nearly a century after the
Civil War ended.
Goluboff paints a vivid picture of the lives of these workers
based primarily on letters of complaint that they wrote to
NAACP and CRS lawyers in the 1930s and 1940s. Those poignant letters reveal how in the south, racial segregation facilitated
the economic subordination of southern Black workers and
made it possible for rural employers to treat their workers as virtual slaves (pp. 52-80). When those workers moved north for a
better life, they encountered less brutal but equally pervasive
segregation that also limited their economic opportunities (pp.

53. See Gratz. 539 U.S. at 297 (2003) (suggesting the Florida 10% plan as an alternative means of obtaining racial diversity).
54. 347 U.S. -183 (1954).
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81-110). Thus, both northern and southern African American
workers described the ways in which race discrimination and racial subordination limited their economic opportunities. However, the primary concern of those workers was not race discrimination, but lack of economic opportunity (pp. 80, 85).
In the rural south, the Jim Crow system treated Blacks as
second class citizens in every facet of their life, and kept their labor cheap by law and brutal force. Black sharecroppers lived in a
"world of white economic domination and black economic dependence" (p. 80), a world which many found impossible to
leave behind. Meanwhile, in the industrial north, "For some African American workers, then, economic opportunity meant the
end of segregation. For others, it meant a willingness to accept
segregation (at least in the short term) in exchange for economic
survival and advancement" (p. 160). Thus, lawyers presented
with these workers' complaints had to try to find a legal strategy
to remedy both economic disempowerment and race discrimination (p. 13).
Under the Brown paradigm, it is axiomatic that the most
promising strategy to address the problems of African American
workers is to sue their employers for race discrimination. However, in the 1930s, the predominance of race over economic injury was far from obvious. Not only was Plessy still the law of the
land, but as Goluboff explains, in the 1930s individual rights
claims were most often framed not as race based civil rights, but
as class based economic rights. Until the mid-1930s, the Court
had found an individual "right to contract" in cases such as
Lochner v. New Yore (p. 25). As a result of the New Deal, the
Court abandoned Lochner, but many contemporary scholars and
practitioners believed that other economic rights would take the
place of the right to contract (p. 26). Unions were politically
powerful, as was their claim that the right to organize was a fundamental right. Thus, ''the most likely replacement for the individual contract rights the Supreme Court had previously protected seemed to be new collective labor and economic rights"
(p. 17).
As the lawyers in the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice began to theorize a way to attack the oppressive
system of Jim Crow, their paradigm was the economic and labor
rights that had been central to the New Deal program of Presi-

55.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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dent Franklin Roosevelt and his political allies (pp. 27-29).
Those lawyers developed a litigation strategy directly attacking
the economic exploitation of southern Black workers. While the
New Deal had largely excluded Black workers by excluding agricultural and domestic workers from its protections, the CRS
lawyers added an element of race equality to workers rights and
attempted to extend those protections to those workers (p. 172).
Thus, they started from the framework of economic rights and
used those rights creatively to further the case of racial equality.
While Brown was based on the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. the CRS lawyers relied instead on
the Thirteenth Amendment and Reconstruction Era antipeonage statutes based on Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment (p. 114). The Thirteenth Amendment, which
outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude, was a natural source
for the CRS attorneys, who invoked the spirit of Reconstruction
as they sought to expand the meaning of that Amendment and
the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes based on Congress'
power to enforce it (p. 135). Members of the Reconstruction
Congress understood the connection between racial subordination and economic oppression and they intended the Thirteenth
Amendment to serve as a tool for the empowerment. not just for
former slaves, but also for workers in general (p. 18)."" Abolitionists such as James Wilson emphasized the depressing effect
that slavery had on the wages of free workers, and the conditions
in which they worked. They argued that the abolition of slavery
would help all workers, white or Black, because "free labor was
not just the absence of slavery and its vestiges; it was the guaran57
tee of an affirmative state of labor autonomy. "
After Reconstruction, members of the nascent American
labor movement nurtured this broad construction of the Thirteenth Amendment's Labor leaders came to believe that working without the right to organize in a union was akin to slavery.
They argued that workers had a constitutional right to organize,
59
embodied in the First and Thirteenth Amendments. Through

56. See also Lea VanderVelde. The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment. 138
U. PA. L REV. 437. 438 (1989).
57. /d. at 438.
58. See James Gray Pope. Labors Constiwtion of Freedom. 106 YALE L.J. 941
(1997).
59. See James Gray Pope. The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause:
Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, /921-1957. 102 COLUM. L REV.
l (2002).
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the late 1930s, union leaders invoked the Thirteenth Amendment and the fight against wage slavery as they lobbied for the
National Labor Relations Act and other protective labor legislation."'' Members of the New Deal Congress were influenced by
this campaign. Members of Congress also invoked the Thirteenth Amendment and the fight against wage slavery as they
spoke in favor of the NLRA during congressional debates." 1 Upholding the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme
Court referred to the right to organize as a fundamental right. 6c
The CRS attorneys reflected the influence of this political
context as they embarked on their campaign to help African
American workers. The CRS was founded by Attorney General
Frank Murphy, the pro-labor former governor of Michigan (p.
111 ). Attorney General Francis Biddle, who had previously
served as chair of the National Labor Relations Board, led the
CRS during its most formative years of 1941-1945 (p. 125). Thus,
the CRS had a strong pro-labor bent and championed workers'
rights. The workers whom they represented were primarily agricultural and domestic workers who did not enjoy a right to organize into a union because they had been excluded from NLRA
coverage (pp. 126-27). The CRS relied on the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude and antipeonage statutes to litigate against unscrupulous farmers who
abused their sharecroppers and tenant farmers (pp. 136-40, 14243). Eventually, the CRS also represented domestic workers who
were virtually confined to the homes of their employers (pp.
162-64).
The CRS attorneys' ultimate goal was also significantly different from that of the Brown paradigm. In Brown, the Court
ruled against state discrimination and established the negative
right of freedom from discrimination (p. 218). In contrast, the
CRS attorneys sought to establish affirmative duties on the part
of the government. They hoped to create a constitutional right to
work for fair wages and under decent conditions (pp. 151-52).
CRS lawyers argued that the United States government had an
affirmative obligation to provide this right, which they described
as "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property" (p. 152).

60.
61.
62.

See ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 65-70.
/d. at 75-80.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co .. 301 U.S. I. 33 (1937).
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The story of the CRS attorneys is only one of two narratives
in The Lost Promise. Goluboff also describes the legal strategy
of the NAACP legal department during the same time period.
Leaders of the NAACP had early on determined that their mission would focus on racial, not economic, equality (p. 176). In
the 1940s, NAACP lawyers led by Thurgood Marshall took on
the cause of industrial workers suffering from the racial discrimination of both employers and unions (p. 180). Because
there were few anti-discrimination statutes, the NAACP lawyers
tried to whittle away at the state action requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause (p. 200). The NAACP lawyers also attempted
to establish a right to work free of race discrimination, a theory
that relied on Lochner Era state court precedents upholding a
substantive right "to pursue one's calling" (pp. 206-08). These
theories enjoyed some success in lower courts (p. 212). However,
by the mid-1940s, the NAACP lawyers began to move away
from their workers' rights cases and focus predominantly on
education as a vehicle to overturn Plessy v. Fergusson (p. 218)."'
Their efforts culminated in the 1954 victory in Brown (p. 240).
Thus, the NAACP attorneys veered away from economic
justice as one of their goals, and eventually wholeheartedly
adopted the more middle class concern about racial segregation
as the Legal Defense Fund established a separate identity from
the main organization (p. 13). As Goluboff points out, the LDF
lawyers faced opposition from many sides, including Republicans, southern Democrats, and anti-Communists (p. 217).
Goluboff explains that those attorneys took the road that they
believed would be the most effective, and the most politically
palatable at the time. Nonetheless, it is clear that Goluboff sees
this decision as a betrayal of the workers whom the NAACP attorneys represented during the pro-labor days of the 1940s.
Ironically, one of the reasons why the LDF reduced its labor
strategy was because the NAACP sought to form more alliances
with unions as a liberal front during the anti-Communist

63. Sophia Z. Lee disagrees with Goluboff on this point. See Sophia Z. Lee. Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace Constitlltionalism. 1948-1964. 26
LAw & HIST. REV. 327 (2008). Lee points out that even while Thurgood Marshall focused on the campaign to end Plessy. local branch lawyers continued to argue that unions
were state actors before administrative agencies. /d. at 332. In 1964. those lawyers
achieved a major victory in the form of an NLRB ruling holding that the NLRB could
not certify a union that discriminated on the basis of race. The NLRB relied on Shelley v.
Kramer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). to hold that the Board's certification met the state action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. Lee, at 336 (citing Hughes Tool. 147 NLRB
1573 (1964 ).
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McCarthy Era, and thus stopped suing unions for race discrimination (pp. 217-37). Nonetheless, it is clear that Goluboff sees
this 1950 decision as a turning point away from an approach to
civil rights that would have more directly helped African American workers, the primary reason why the "promise" was "lost."
Goluboff provides less information about the evolution of
the CRS legal strategy, probably because it mostly occurred after
the time period covered by the book. I would love to know more
about the decline of the anti-peonage strategy. Also omitted
from Goluboff's story is the alliance of labor with the civil rights
movement in the early 1960s, and their joint success in the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Nonetheless, it is apparent that political forces
influenced the turn of the CRS lawyers away from economic
empowerment and towards anti-segregation, just as it had with
their LDF colleagues. Those forces included the antiCommunism of the McCarthy era, which threatened those daring enough to espouse class-consciousness, and the rise of the
civil rights movement, which emphasized racial segregation over
overtly economic issues (pp. 256-58).
Goluboff ends her book by evaluating the impact of Brown
on contemporary legal thought. It really is difficult to exaggerate
the impact of Brown on current constitutional doctrine and
equality law. As Goluboff explains, Brown established "the legal
and intellectual framework that continues to dominate how lawyers and laypeople alike think about civil rights." (p. 240). In
that framework, the prototypical plaintiff is not the worker seeking economic rights, but the child seeking to combat the social
stigma of racial segregation. "Enshrined in constitutional law,
then, was Brown's image of a Jim Crow that had as its central
harm the psychological injury of inferiority." (p. 244). According
to Goluboff, the gravitational pull of Brown eventually ended
civil rights lawyers' experimentation with economic-based civil
rights. As she explains, the image of Jim Crow in the Brown
opinion "divorced the seventy-five-year-old caste system from its
economic roots, or its material inequalities, from the farm workers who complained about immobility and the industrial workers
who complained about their inability to make a living." (p. 251 ).
As a result, ''the new civil rights would prove fundamentally unable to redress the economic hierarchies of Jim Crow America."
(p. 244).
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IV. RIGHTS OF BELONGING AND ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT
In the twenty-first century. it is apparent that facial equality
alone is not sufficient to remedy the centuries of economic and
race-based subordination of people of color in our society. In
order to truly belong, outsiders need not just permission to belong, but also a means of belonging. The Lost Promise gives us a
good foundation for imagining the content of those rights of belonging. The book also reminds us that rights of belonging have
more than one doctrinal basis. Because of its promise of both racial equality and economic empowerment, the Thirteenth
Amendment is a crucial source of rights of belonging. Finally.
because rights of belonging are positive rights, they must come
primarily from positive law. In the twenty-first century, we
should expect legislatures, not the courts. to play the leading role
in establishing and protecting rights of belonging.
The Lost Promise teaches us three lessons about rights of
belonging. First, those rights must include economic rights as
well as anti-discrimination norms. Second. those rights come not
just from the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been so limited
by the Supreme Court, but also from the as yet untapped potential of the Thirteenth Amendment, which establishes both the
right to racial equality and the end of the economic subordination of workers. Finally, as positive rights, rights of belonging are
best suited to enforcement not by the federal courts. but by the
political branches. Thus, the conceptualization of rights of belonging must occur not within the confines of federal litigation.
but instead as the result of a robust political debate.
First, in order to truly facilitate the belonging of outsiders in
our society, rights of belonging include economic rights as well
as anti-discrimination rights. This is not a new insight. Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr., took his last fateful trip to Memphis in support of sanitation workers who were on strike in order to achieve
the right to form a union and to earn a living wage. The slogan
on the signs that those workers carried, "I am a man," reflected
their belief that they were fighting not just for economic rights
but for dignity and respect. The sanitation workers in Memphis
understood that in order to belong to their community as equal
citizens. they needed the economic empowerment that a right to
join a union would bring to them.
Goluboff reminds us that the right to join a union was once
considered a fundamental human right, the most important of all
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"civil rights," not just by labor leaders, but also by the general
public. In the decades leading up to the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act, workers fought, suffered, and even died for
the right to form unions. 64 The right to organize into a union is a
fundamental right of belonging. It facilitates not only the economic empowerment of workers, but also their political empowerment.
However, unions were a mixed blessing for African Americans during the 1940s and 1950s. Some unions welcomed Blacks
with open arms and launched the careers of civil rights leaders
such as A. Philip Randolph."' Other unions discriminated against
African Americans (pp. 96-100). Many unions were segregated,
and union leaders often did their best to keep African Americans away from the better skilled, better paying jobs (p. 95).
Even when they were allowed to be members, Blacks often
lacked meaningful representation in their unions. This situation
often put Black workers in the uncomfortable position of opposing unions, suing them for race discrimination, where such a
remedy was available."" As a remedy, the NLRB and some state
courts ordered employers to reinstate Black workers even if they
could not be union members (p. 212).
Over time, relationships between unions and people of
color have improved. By the late 1940s, the NAACP had allied
itself with unions and stopped litigating labor cases. including
discrimination cases against unions (p. 222). During the next
decade the NAACP and leading unions cemented their alliances.
UA W leader Walter Reuther helped to lead the fight for the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and union support was essential to its passage."7 In the early twenty-first century, some of the most vibrant
unions, such as UNITE, have large minority memberships."H Union membership also continues to be one of the most important
sources of empowerment for low-income people, including jani-

64. See, e.g.. Zietlow & Pope. The Alllo-Lite Strike. supra note 42.
65. See Martha Biondi. TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY 17 (2003).
66. Federal agencies were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race.
though some openly discriminated. In 1935. the NAACP supported an amendment to the
NLRA that would have prohibited unions from discriminating on the basis of race. but
the amendment failed. In its suits against unions. the NAACP relied upon state laws including the New York Fair Employment Practices Act. and the federal Railwav labors
Act (p. 195).
67. See Rebecca Zietlow. To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005).
68. http://www.unitehere.org/presscenter/factsheet.php.
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tors and service employees. Union membership has declined
dramatically since its height in the mid-1950s,fi9 due in large part
to Supreme Court rulings narrowly interpreting the National
Labor Relations Act. 70 The NLRA should be amended to
strengthen its protections for the workers' right to organize.
To determine what other economic rights are rights of belonging, a good starting place is the era that Goluboff describes
in her book. At the beginning of his fourth term as president,
Franklin Roosevelt proposed a "Second Bill of Rights," which
included the right to a job at an adequate wage, decent housing,
medical care, and education (p. 35). Roosevelt's Bill of Rights
would have established an affirmative obligation on the part of
the government to provide for its citizens. As Roosevelt's successor, President Harry Truman explained in a 1947 speech at
the Lincoln Memorial, "The extension of civil rights today
means not protection of the people against the Government, but
71
protection of the people by the Government" (p. 141). Initially,
Roosevelt's proposal was well received. The elite American Law
Institute convened an international committee to write up "the
essential statement of human rights" which "emphasized that
economic rights were a necessary part of any modern state," and
the United Nations, which was formed in 1945, adopted similar
guarantees (p. 141). Congress considered a Full Employment
Bill in 1945, which would have created a right of "all Americans"
to "useful, remunerative, regular, and fulltime employment" and
obliged the federal government to vindicate that right (p. 141).
After World War II ended, the political tide turned to the
right, anti-Communism flourished, and the Full Employment
Act failed (p. 39). However, Roosevelt's initiative still serves as a
foundation for other economic rights of belonging. While it is
difficult to imagine the government guaranteeing a right to employment or housing, polls show that a majority of Americans
already believe that education and access to health care are fundamental rights. Because education and health care are so essential to economic advancement, and even survival, they fit within
69. In 2007. 12.1 percent of employed wage and salary workers were members of
unions. In 1983. the number was 20.1 percent. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics Press Release. USDL 08-0092. January 25. 2008. http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
70. See James Gray Pope. How Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales.
103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004).
71. For an in-depth discussion of the CRS vision of the role of government in protecting civil rights under Truman, see ROBERT K. CARR. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD ( 1947).
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the rubric of twenty-first century rights of belonging. Like Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights, these rights would create a posi72
tive obligation by the government.
The Lost Promise also reminds us that there is more than
one doctrinal basis for civil rights. Under the Brown paradigm,
the equal protection clause dominated anti-discrimination law in
the second half of the twentieth century. Apart from the years of
the CRS, and despite its wide-ranging promise, the Thirteenth
Amendment has been an under-enforced and under-appreciated
constitutional provision. Recently, however, there has been a
73
surge of scholarly interest in that amendment. Members of
Congress also have revived the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power by enacting the Trafficking Victims Protection
74
Act of 2000 and relying on it as a foundation of a proposed
Hate Crimes Act. 75 Despite its recent rulings narrowly construing
the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, the United
States Supreme Court continues to construe the Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power broadly. 7" The twenty-first century may well be the century of the Thirteenth Amendment. For
those who wish to address the intersection of race and class in
our society, it is the fountainhead of constitutional law.
The Thirteenth Amendment has several advantages over
the Fourteenth as a source of civil rights remedies. First, unlike
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment's
scope is not limited to state action. On its face, the Thirteenth
Amendment applies to private action, and the Court has inter-

72. Therefore. for reasons explained below. they are best suited for enforcement by
Congress. not the federal courts.
73. See, e.g.. ALEXANDER TSESIS. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY (2004): Pope. Thirteenth Amendment versus
the Commerce Clause. supra note 59.
74. See Peonage. Slavery and Trafficking in Persons Act. 18 U.S.C. §1581 (June 25,
1948. c. 645,62 Stat. 772: Sept. 13. 1994. Pub. L. 103-322. Title XXXIII. §33016(1)(K). 108
Stat. 2147: Sept. 30. 1996. Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C. Title II. §218(a), 110 Stat. 3009-573:
Oct. 28.2000. Pub. L. 106-386. Div. A. §112(a)(1). 114 Stat. 1486).
75. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592. The
Act passed the House of Representatives and was referred to the Senate Committee on
May 7. 2007. H.R. 110-113. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a similar provision on
the Senate side. S. 1105. the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2007. S. 4445-4447.
76. The most recent example is a case this term in which the Supreme Court held
that Section 1981. a provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibiting race discrimination
in contracts based on the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. authorized a remedy for retaliatory actions on the part of employers. See CBOCS. Inc. v. Humphries. 128
S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
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preted it that way on numerous occasions. 77 Second, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits any badges or incidents of slavery
based on race, so it is an excellent source of anti-racediscrimination law. Third, the Amendment is also a potent
source of workers' rights, because it provides protection against
the economic exploitation of workers. Thus, the Thirteenth
Amendment provides a source of anti-subordination law without
triggering the awkward equality/difference dilemma posed by
the equal protection clause.
Finally, The Lost Promise highlights the key role that the
political branches play in defining and enforcing rights of belonging. Under the Brown paradigm, courts do the work of creating civil rights, protecting minorities against the discrimination
7
of the majority. " The Lost Promise reminds us how important it
is for supporters of civil rights to engage the political process as
well. President Roosevelt created the CRS and the CRS enjoyed
strong support from his Attorneys General, Murphy and Biddle.
Roosevelt's successor, President Harry Truman, also strongly
supported its efforts (pp. 38-40). CRS lawyers pursued a litigation strategy that was complementary to the efforts of members
of Congress to expand the rights of workers. At the request of
the CRS, Congress amended the Anti-Peonage Act in 1948 to
strengthen its provisions and expand the meaning of involuntary
servitude (p. 150). The CRS and the NAACP both lobbied regularly for federal legislation expanding civil rights. In the twentyfirst century, re-imagining civil rights as rights of belonging must
happen within the political process, not the confines of the U.S.
courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Risa Goluboff's The Lost Promise of Civil Rights teaches us
a great deal about the roots of our modern civil rights tradition.
Goluboff tells us what lawyers thought during those formative
years, and she details the decisions they made that shaped the
civil rights paradigm today. But most importantly, in The Lost
Promise, Goluboff gives us a sense of where to go tomorrow.
This provocative book was intended to open our eyes and make
77. See, e.g.. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co .. 392 U.S. 409 (1968): Runyon v.
McCrary. 427 U.S. 160. 172 (1976): Patterson v. McClean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164
(1989).
78. See Michael J. Klarman. Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions. 82 Y A. L. REV. I ( 1996 ).
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us question the paradigm that shapes the way that civil rights
lawyers practice and the way that constitutional law scholars
think about equality rights. Goluboff has triggered a crucial conversation about the future of civil rights. and a foundation for reenvisioning those rights as rights of belonging. Let us hope that
the conversation continues.

